Let's start with the main thing - Ukraine as it is now will not overcome the demographic crisis. And this is not only due to the war - even by 2022, the country's birth rate was significantly behind mortality and emigration. Back in 2020, in a publication of the journal Lancet group of scientists who made demographic forecasts predicted that the number of Ukrainians would be halved by 2050.

We find ourselves in the midst of a perfect storm of unfavorable demographic factors - a decades-long decline in birth rates, rising mortality, the capture of millions of people in the occupied territories, and an impressive scale of emigration.

You can write a book comparing a large number of statistical calculations and survey data, which often contradict each other, but it is impossible not to see that over the past 10 years, Ukraine has lost more people in one way or another than during the Holodomor, and this process continues. Out of all the information about the demographic war we are losing, I propose to focus on three important facts:

• First fact The number of children in Ukraine is decreasing and will continue to decrease. The general downward trend in the birth rate in post-industrial countries, the large number of divorced families during the war, and the uncertain future all affect the number of Ukrainians of the future. According to forecasts, in 2027 there will be only 570 thousand preschool children in Ukraine (almost 2 million at the beginning of 2022). 
  
• Second fact We have already experienced several waves of emigration from the country, but there will be more. Refugees to the EU and the US were the first and largest wave, and now men of conscription and pre-conscription age are leaving the country. And although a quarter of emigrants still declare their desire to return, it should be understood that at least one more wave of emigration of men who want to reunite with their families after the borders are opened awaits us.
  
• Third fact We cannot hope that our demographics will be fixed by a large number of migrants. We were not an attractive country for migration even before 2022 - rather, Ukraine was seen as a transit country on the way to Europe. In addition, attempts to regulate the demographic situation at the expense of migrants from other countries have their own risks, from social to political.
  

The reality is quite sad, but this is not a reason to give up - we are not fighting for our country to give up on this quiet but important front.At the same time, we should clearly understand the challenges we face. It is a clear analysis of the impact of the situation on important areas of life in Ukraine that should form the basis for creating effective and sustainable solutions.

It should be noted at the outset that the plans to create new programs to encourage fertility and invite emigrants to return, on which the government is relying today, will have very limited impact and will not be able to change the situation. Ukrainians in Ukraine will not give birth en masse for the sake of money, and Ukrainians abroad will not return home simply because we appealed to their nostalgia and held a festival of Ukrainian culture in the European city where they have lived for three or more years.

That is why it is necessary to accustom ourselves to the idea of how to develop in the face of a constant demographic crisis - what to do to ensure that Ukrainians, whose number will decrease and whose average age will increase, will be able not only to maintain a sufficient standard of living but also to move forward. It is the ability to withstand this blow and develop in these conditions that will determine how attractive Ukraine will be for returning emigrants and attracting the kind of migrants it needs. Unfortunately, as much as we would like it, there are no ready-made answers to all these questions. At the moment, there is only an understanding that there is a great need for an honest conversation and a thorough analysis of future trends in Ukrainian life.

As an example, I will cite a small part of the million questions whose answers should form the basis for creating truly effective strategies for Ukraine's adaptation to existence in the face of the demographic crisis.

How do we plan to develop our economy? On the one hand, the obvious consequence of the decline in the number of workers should be the technologicalization and robotization of most processes, from agricultural production to service delivery, but to what extent will this process be limited by the growing shortage of young people? Which sectors of the economy should be prioritized and receive state support? To what extent will the Minerals Agreement we are about to sign with the United States affect the contours of the Ukrainian economy? How will the tax system change - who will it primarily support and who will bear the brunt?

How will the social services sector grow and change in the face of fewer children and more elderly people? What services should be developed to stimulate birth rates and the return of families from emigration? How should social services for veterans and people with disabilities be developed? How will the education system change, given the decline in the number of children? How will this affect the forms and quality of education? How to prioritize STEM in the education system to support further modernization and technologicalization of the country?

How will the medical system change, given the growing number of elderly people?  

I won't go into the pension system issue - it is a painful issue, and it is obvious that in the near future our pension system will be supported by our partners for the period of recovery after the war. But the decline in the number of workers and the growth in the number of pensioners is also a challenge that we will have to overcome in the future and develop options now. Moreover, the option where the retirement age is 10 years higher than the average life expectancy in the country is not an acceptable option.

How will the security sector in Ukraine change? A decrease in the number of Ukrainians directly affects the country's combat capability. And even though we are now the most experienced army in Europe, what will happen tomorrow? Another issue is internal security - how will the crime structure and types of crimes change? To what extent will security processes be affected by migration, which we will have to encourage in one way or another?

The same questions arise as to how the country's culture will change - how to bridge the generation gap, the cultural gap between Ukrainians in Ukraine and abroad. How to maintain the cultural and mental connection between Ukrainians and their homeland. This topic is one of the most important, because the children and grandchildren of Ukrainians abroad are our potential future, and we can count on their return if we do everything right.

This is only a small part of the issues that we must start discussing on our own and with our partners, and the answers to which will determine the future of the country. The cost of inaction, or searching for and choosing “easy” and “quick” answers, will be too high.